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The Evolution of Intergovernmental Cooperation  
in the European process. 
 
 
 
The Luxemburg report, also known as the Davignon report, adopted by Foreign 
Ministers in October 1970 is a generally accepted departure point for 
intergovernmental cooperation among members of the European Community. It was 
the first time that the “Community method”, devised by Jean Monnet and   
consolidated by the treaty of Rome on the basis of texts prepared by the Spaak 
Committee, was deliberately discarded, in the field of foreign policy, in favour of the 
traditional methods of diplomatic consultation, in an exercise initially known as 
“political cooperation”. 
 
The significance of that initial step can only be understood by a flashback to the failure 
of the Fouchet negotiations in the spring of 1962. That negotiation, launched and 
largely dominated by General de Gaulle, had been understood by his partners as a 
deliberate attempt to subordinate the nascent European Community to an 
intergovernmental construction established in Paris, presumably dominated by France, 
and without any of the supranational procedures or institutions which had made 
Monnet’s proposals acceptable to the smaller countries. Its final failure was 
immediately perceived as a turning point, as a clear parting of the ways between the 
Gaullist concept of l’Europe des patries and the supranational concept developed in 
the fifties. It was moreover quite acrimonious: participants accusing each other of 
arrogant and irresponsible behaviour. In his memoirs Paul-Henri Spaak, who played a 
prominent role both as Belgian Foreign Minister and as foster father of the treaty of 
Rome, clearly puts the responsibility on the shoulders of Couve de Murville. Years 
later, in a reflective mood, he asked himself, in my presence, whether he had not, at 
the time, been too intransigent.  Whatever the merits of the case, the exercise left all 
parties with the sour taste of an important failure. 
 
The merit of the Davignon report was to find acceptable compromises on the issues 
which had led to that failure. The proposed concept was limited in scope: foreign 
policy stricto sensu, security matters being left to NATO. It would have no legal basis, 
no institutions and no seat: the model was that of a travelling circus moving from 
presidency to presidency. European Community and NATO competences were 
specifically safeguarded and the Commission associated in a limited way to the new 
exercise. On that basis ministers came to an agreement. The European Economic 
Community would henceforth be complemented by an intergovernmental  exercise 
parallel to it, and therefore also distinct from it. Political cooperation was born. 
 
All compromises, even good ones, contain an element of ambiguity. And  ministerial 
decisions do not automatically dispel mutual suspicions. Political cooperation 
developed, quite successfully, in the seventies and eighties in an atmosphere of some 
ambiguity and some suspicion. These were mutual. The Commission and its friends, 
specially the Benelux countries, were afraid that ministerial meetings in the 
intergovernmental mode would encroach on Community competences and institutions. 
On the other side, France, frequently supported by Britain, was keen to avoid   2
interference by  Community institutions in foreign policy matters. A maximum level 
of paranoia was reached  on a certain day in 1973 when, at the insistence of the French 
minister Michel Jobert, ministers met in the morning in Copenhagen in political 
cooperation, and in the afternoon in Brussels as a Council.  
 
Common sense and the habit of working together gradually  reduced the suspicions, if 
not the ambiguity. The presence of the Commission, very limited at the beginning, was 
progressively extended to cover practically all working groups. Ministers agreed to 
answer questions on political cooperation in the European Parliament. Community 
activities and political cooperation were clearly separate, but not antagonistic.  
 
But the very name of the Single European Act concluded in February 1986 shows how 
touchy the whole subject  remained even after fifteen years of practice. That treaty was 
the first substantial modification of the treaty of Rome, including the first mention of  
monetary union, and it gave, also for the first time, a legal basis to political 
cooperation, with a permanent secretariat in Brussels as administrative support. 
Inquisitive young students must ask themselves why this document has passed down 
to new generations with the qualification of  “single”. The answer is that the two parts 
of the treaty (Community affairs and political cooperation) had been negotiated 
separately (basically by COREPER and the Political Committee) and the decision to 
bring them together in one legal text was only taken at the last minute and at the 
highest level. That decision had been uncertain. It seemed so momentous, hopefully 
putting an end to years of tiresome quarrels and dogmatic disputes, that negotiators, 
including myself, greeted it with enthusiasm. The fact that a legal text covered both 
Community affairs and political cooperation, which had never been the case before, 
suddenly became more important than its content, although that content was quite 
substantial. This explains the fact, possibly unique in diplomatic history, that a treaty 
is known not by the name of the town where it was signed (Luxemburg in this case) 
nor by a summary of its content, but  by an adjective which underlines the bringing 
together of two separate texts. And the importance given at the time to that historical 
fact, which today would seem to justify no more than a footnote, shows that the 
wounds of the sixties were not completely healed. With hindsight, I feel that we were 
right to attach importance to what was happening because it was the first significant 
step on a road pursued to this day: gradual rapprochement  between Community 
business and intergovernmental cooperation. 
 
The next stage on this road was the treaty of Maastricht and the negotiation of that text 
was deeply scarred by the question of the relationship between those two forms of 
European activity. In the spring of 1991 the Luxemburg presidency, on the basis of  
several months of negotiation in the intergovernmental conference, put a draft treaty 
text on the table which divided the various activities of the Union in pillars : a 
Community pillar and two intergovernmental pillars for foreign and security policy on 
the one hand, justice and home affairs on the other. Each pillar would work according 
to different rules and procedures. This innovation was of course hotly debated. 
Belgium and the Netherlands saw a threat to the Community method which had served 
us so well over the years, but the majority of the Council seemed ready to go down 
that road. In the course of the summer the incoming Dutch presidency drafted an 
alternative text which rejected the pillar structure, brought foreign policy and justice 
into the Community fold but with much reduced objectives and ambitions. The 
presidency misread the political signals and ran straight into a wall, at the end of   3
September, when all member states, except Belgium, declared in Council that they 
preferred the Luxemburg approach. To this day that meeting is known in Dutch 
diplomatic circles as “Black Monday”. Much has been written on the causes of that 
failure but, for the purpose of this article, the central point is that the major drama of 
the Maastricht negotiation turned on the relationship between Community affairs and 
intergovernmental cooperation. As everybody knows the text agreed in Maastricht is 
based on the pillar structure, initially suggested by Luxemburg. It fixed the goal of a 
common foreign and security policy, which was, and remains, a very ambitious 
objective. 
 
Again with hindsight it seems to me that we failed to take into account, at that time, 
the intrinsic difference between the second and third pillars. Foreign policy, justice 
and home affairs all deal with matters close to the core of national sovereignty, which 
explains, without necessarily justifying, why national governments wish to retain 
control. But they are very different. Foreign and security policy is essentially 
executive in nature : it is based not on legislation but on political decisions. In most 
countries Parliament has little effective influence on foreign policy. The field of 
justice, on the other hand,  is essentially legislative in nature: it implies harmonisation 
of legislation, mutual recognition of acts and procedures,  the sort of thing we have 
been doing for years to establish the single market. The implication is that 
intergovernmental cooperation, which basically means unanimous decision in Council, 
is much better adapted to foreign policy than it is to justice and home affairs. 
Establishing identical procedures in the two pillars was not an optimal solution.  
 
That point was taken up by the treaty of Amsterdam signed in October 1997. The clear 
separation between pillars, which had been the essence of the compromise leading to 
Maastricht, was blurred in the field of what was now called the area of freedom, 
security and justice. Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters remained in 
the third pillar, but migration, asylum and judicial cooperation in civil matters was 
incorporated in a new title of the Community treaty. However procedures in that title 
were not to be fully comunautaire,  even after a transition period of five years. 
Unanimous decision remained the general rule, the power of Parliament and the 
jurisdiction of the Court were limited. Another significant result of the Amsterdam 
negotiation was to incorporate the acquis of the Schengen Convention into the treaty 
framework, with opt outs for Britain, Denmark and Ireland. But the protocol doing that 
is presented as an annex to both the European Community treaty and the European 
Union treaty, which is another example of ambiguity on the pillar structure. Foreign 
policy and security, on the other hand, remained clearly separate from Community 
business. The treaty created the post of High Representative/ Secretary General of the 
Council, in charge of CFSP, an innovation which was to have significant 
consequences in later years.   
 
The relaxed attitude of the treaty of Amsterdam  towards what had been in the past a 
subject of ideological confrontation between the Community method and 
inergovernmentalism was typical of a trend. After the climactic confrontation of the 
treaty of Maastricht, the advocates of the Community method accepted that some form 
of intergovernmental cooperation would coexist with it, even in treaty texts. And the 
advocates of intergovernmental cooperation accepted that European institutions could 
play some role, without compromising the nature of that cooperation. Intermediate 
solutions then became possible, such as the one retained for asylum and migration in   4
the treaty of Amsterdam. In “The Case for Europe”, published shortly after the 
signing of that treaty, I described “a multiform network of procedures and 
heterogeneous constructions, providing flexible answers to differing needs.” 
 
That trend was to be confirmed in the following years, not by the treaty of Nice which 
makes no relevant contribution in this debate, but by practice.  Two examples are the 
Lisbon process and the role of Solana. 
 
The “open method of coordination” was devised by the Lisbon European Council in 
March 2000 because member states, while recognising that common efforts were 
needed in the field of economic and social policy and innovation, were in no way 
ready to accept the transfers of sovereignty which an extension of the Community 
method  would have entailed. Yet the Lisbon process is not purely intergovernmental : 
it is based on benchmarking and peer review in which the Commission plays a role of 
scrutinizer of national policies and the European Council (of which the Commission is 
a member) a role of guidance and arbitration. Helen Wallace calls it “intensive 
transgovernementalism” in which “the primary actors are leading national policy-
makers, operating in highly interactive mode and developing new forms of 
commitment and mutual engagement”. Many observers consider today that the Lisbon 
process is failing to deliver its promises but, whatever its merits, the fact is that it was 
conceived as a sort of halfway house between the Community method and traditional 
intergovernmental cooperation. 
 
When creating the post of  High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
policy, negotiators in Amsterdam had certainly no intention of departing from the 
intergovernmental character which had always been given to that policy. But when the 
European Council appointed to that post a former foreign minister and secretary 
general of NA TO, instead of the high level civil servant whom many had expected, a 
subtle element of change was introduced. With time, tact and political acumen, Javier 
Solana has created for himself a situation in which he is not simply a reflection of the 
common will of ministers in Council. When taking the floor in the Security Council, 
putting his signature on a treaty between Serbia and Montenegro or discussing nuclear 
issues in Teheran, Solana obviously avoids taking positions or making statements 
which would antagonise some member states. But he has  a margin of freedom, and he 
is perceived, much more than successive presidencies, as the impersonation of the 
common European interest in the field of foreign policy. That growing perception, 
shared by member states and foreign powers, gives him a role not unlike that which 
the Commission plays in Community affairs. He heads an intergovernmental 
institution but the purists of the sixties and seventies, like Couve de Murville or 
Michel Jobert , would not recognise him as one of theirs. In a way he has become an 
institution! 
 
The Convention, and the Constitutional treaty based on its conclusions, are clearly to 
be understood as confirming, accelerating and extending the trend identified above. 
The most spectacular example of this is the proclaimed abolition of the pillar structure. 
It is possible to argue that this move is more apparent than real: if pillars no longer 
exist as such, procedures remain different and separate. But the simple fact that what 
had been  a fundamental element of the Maastricht compromise could now be, at least 
partly but openly, discarded, shows a considerable evolution in minds. An even more 
cogent example is the concept of a Foreign Minister simultaneously sitting as Vice   5
President of the Commission. One could hardly imagine a clearer way of blurring the 
lines between Community affairs and intergovernmental cooperation. It is certainly 
significant that this proposal was initially opposed both by the Commission and the 
Council secretariat. Both Solana and Patten expressed serious misgivings in the 
Convention working group discussing this proposal. It was going straight against long 
accepted orthodoxy on both sides. And yet it prevailed, and today is frequently put 
forward as a proposal which should be retained even if the treaty itself was never to 
come into force. There is no doubt in my mind that the role played by representatives 
of the new member states in the Convention is highly significant in this respect. They 
were naturally less connected to the fundamental debates of the early years of the 
Community. They  did not bear the intellectual scars of long battles, won or lost, on 
that ideological battlefield. The issues were new to them and they addressed them with 
common sense. 
 
It would be tempting to conclude that the ideological debate of  the early years has 
now been settled, with some remains of ambiguity and mutual suspicion, by 
successive compromises. A word of caution is needed. Those compromises are fragile 
and the debate could flare up again on the basis of a new ideological cleavage. The 
founding fathers shared with de Gaulle, and all other European leaders at the time, a 
commitment to some form of social market economy (obviously not under that name). 
Their debate, described in this contribution, was about the level at which intervention 
and regulation is most appropriately exercised: transfer of powers to European 
institutions was felt by some to undermine the freedom and sovereignty of member 
States. Today the transfer, and even the exercise of existing powers by European 
institutions is felt by some, in Britain and elsewhere, to undermine the freedom and 
sovereignty of the market. That is of course another debate, fuelled by different views 
on the conclusions to be drawn from  globalisation. That ideological debate reaches 
the very foundations of our societies. It concerns the legitimate role of all institutions. 
If it develops into a major issue at the continental level, the compromises described 
above will be of little use. 
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